'Capacitas': Contract Law and the Institutional Preconditions of a Market Economy by Simon Deakin
 
‘CAPACITAS’: CONTRACT LAW AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 





Centre for Business Research, University Of Cambridge 










University of Cambridge 
Centre for Business Research 
Judge Business School Building 
Trumpington Street 


















This working paper forms part of the CBR Research Programme on Corporate 
Governance.  
Abstract 
Capacity  may  be  defined  as  a  status  conferred  by  law  for  the  purpose  of 
empowering persons to participate in the operations of a market economy.  This 
paper argues that because of the confining influence of the classical private law 
of the nineteenth century, we currently lack a convincing theory of the role of 
law in enhancing and protecting the substantive contractual capacity of market 
agents,  a  notion  which  resembles  the  economic  concept  of  ‘capability’  as 
developed by Amartya Sen.  Re-examining the legal notion of capacity from the 
perspective of Sen’s ‘capability approach’ is part of a process of understanding 
the preconditions for a sustainable market order under modern conditions.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The  concept  of  capacitas,  whose  roots  lie  in  Roman  law,  signifies  a  status 
conferred upon citizens for the purpose of enabling them to participate in the 
economic life of the polity.  In modern legal systems, ‘capacity’ is the principal 
juridical mechanism by which individuals and entities are empowered to enter 
into legally binding agreements and, more generally, to arrange their affairs 
using the instruments of private law.  The legal concept of capacity is thereby 
the  gateway  to  involvement  in  the  operations  of  a  market  economy.    In  its 
traditional  form,  originating  in  the  ‘classical’  contract  law  of  the  nineteenth 
century, capacity is defined negatively, that is to say, by its absence: the very 
young,  very  old  or  very  ill  are  deemed,  to  varying  degrees  according  to 
particular contexts, to lack the ability to make legally enforceable contracts.  
This is because they are understood not to possess the power to make rational 
assessments  of  their  own  self-interest  of  the  kind required  for  market-based 
exchange.    The  concept  of  capacity  is  a  doctrine  of  selective  contract 
enforcement, which both protects the incapable from exploitation, but, equally 
importantly, protects the market against the incapable.  In this way the classical 
core of contract law gives expression to a certain theory of the institutional 
preconditions of a market economy, albeit a rather minimalist one.   
 
Incapacity  is  not  the  only  occasion  for  invalidating  contractual  agreements 
made at arm’s length between consenting parties.  Contract law recognizes that 
certain types of transaction can be denied contractual force on the grounds that 
they infringe particular values which, exceptionally, take priority over the value 
of freedom of contract.  In the common law, these go under the heading of 
‘public  policy’,  and  their  effect  is  to  qualify  the  power  to  make  binding 
agreements which is otherwise generally vested in economic agents.  This body 
of law therefore offers fragments of a theory of functional limits to freedom of 
contract: these limits are necessary both to preserve the market against anti-
competitive behaviour (as in the case, for example, of the doctrine of ‘restraint 
of trade’), and also to preserve society itself against the market (for example, 
the  rules  against  the  enforcement  of  certain  illegal  or  oppressive  contracts).  
These are no more than fragments, though; the common law notion of public 
policy is an extremely limited one which was frozen in time at the end of the 
nineteenth  century.    Social  or  regulatory  legislation  has  become  a  far  more 
significant source of contractual regulation.  However, its relationship to the 
notion  of  contractual  capacity  is  highly  contested:  does  a  law  inserting 
mandatory or default norms into consumer or employment contracts constrain 
the  autonomy  of  the  contracting  parties,  with  negative  effects  upon  the 
operation  of  the  market;  or  does  it  establish  a  new  contractual  equilibrium   2 
which,  by  reducing  transaction  costs  and  reallocating  risks,  enhances 
efficiency? 
 
Modern ‘law and economics’ analysis suggests that there is often no simple 
answer to that question.  Nevertheless, the efficiency of social legislation as a 
mode of contractual regulation is increasingly being called into question.  This 
is the consequence of the unraveling of institutional forms which were designed 
to  for  a  world  of  protected  national  economies  and  stable  economic 
relationships; the principal example of this is the conceptual ‘crisis’ affecting 
the institution of the employment relationship.
1  However, it unlikely that a 
simple return to private law, through ‘deregulation’, could offer a sustainable 
solution.  This is because the classical or nineteenth century core of private law, 
to which deregulation promises to return us, offers an under-developed account 
of the basis for effective participation in economic life: this is one in which 
form – an idealised notion of juridical equality and contractual autonomy – 
prevails over substance – a reality of asymmetrical bargaining power and all-
pervasive  externalities.    The  problem  is  epitomized  by  the  paucity  of  the 
modern legal concept of capacity and by the conceptual confusion surrounding 
this notion.  In particular, we lack a convincing theory of the role of law in 
enhancing and protecting the substantive contractual capacity of market agents, 
a notion which resembles the economic concept of ‘capability’.
2  Re-examining 
the legal notion of capacity from the perspective of the economist’s ‘capability 
approach’  is  part  of  a  process  of  understanding  the  preconditions  for  a 
sustainable market order under today’s conditions.   
 
To  address  that  question,  section  2  examines  in  more  detail  the  implicit 
economic  logic  of  the  concept  of  capacity,  explores  its  links  to  notions  of 
individual rationality, and assesses the economic functionality of private law 
rules  limiting freedom  of  contract.    Section 3  then  looks  at  the  relationship 
between contractual capacity and regulatory legislation and section 4 considers 
the  deregulatory  critique  against  the  insertion  of  mandatory  norms  into 
contractual relationships.  Section 5 then addresses the following question: is it 
possible to identify the elements of a new concept of capacitas, one which goes 
beyond purely formal guarantees of market access, to encompass the conditions 
needed for effective participation in the complex economic orders which are 
now coming into being?   
   3 
2. The economic logic of incapacity, public policy, and related grounds of 
invalidity in contract law 
 
In  civil  law  systems,  contractual  capacity  is  stated  to  be  one  of  the  basic 
conditions for the formation of a contract.
3  In the civil law, ‘capacity’ has two 
meanings, one referring to the ability to hold rights,
4 the other to the ability to 
exercise  them.
5    Contractual  incapacity  is  almost  invariably  an  instance  of 
second of these two categories.  The capacity to hold rights, which is in effect a 
right to be treated as a legal subject and not as a mere object of legal relations, 
vests today in all physical persons from the point of birth,
6 as a result of the 
abolition of rules denying capacity to certain groups historically denied it, 
7such 
as married women.  This is equally the position in the common law, where the 
formal  distinction  between  the  holding  and  exercising  or  rights  is  of  no 
relevance.    In  all  systems,  the  remaining  grounds  of  incapacity  are  tightly 
defined; they mostly apply to agreements made by ‘minors’ (or ‘infants’), the 
very old, and those suffering from mental illness.   The question of contractual 
capacity has been said to be of ‘reduced practical significance’ in the English 
law  of  contract;  although  not  without  some  theoretical  interest,  particularly 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  interaction  of  contractual  and  restitutionary 
remedies, it is essentially treated as a footnote to the main body of the law of 
contract.    The  relative  insignificance  of  the  subject  for  English  lawyers  is 
compounded by the absence of certain complex rules of French-origin civil law 
systems,  dealing  with  the  circumstances  under  which  lack  of  contractual 
capacity  can  be  offset  by  assistance  (curatelle)  or  representation  (tutelle).
8  
These have no equivalent in the English common law, and even some civil law 
systems, such as the German one, do not recognize the category of assistance.
9  
In all systems, the effects of incapacity on a contract also differ according to 
context; complete nullity is only one option, others including voidability, while 
alternative remedies in tort or restitution may be available.
10 
 
The limited and diminishing practical significance of the concept of capacity in 
modern  contract  law  should  not  however  be  confused  with  its  structural 
significance within contract doctrine.  Indeed, there is case for saying that it is 
still at the core what is meant by a contractual obligation.  A simple exchange, 
even between otherwise consenting parties, is not enough to found a contract.  It 
has  to  be  shown,  in  addition,  that  each  party  is  able  to  assess  whether  the 
transaction is in their best interests.  The law presumes that this may not be so 
in the case of the young, on the grounds of their immaturity and inexperience, 
and to those such as the very old or mentally ill who for one reason or another 
may be unable to understand the consequences of their actions.   
   4 
Put slightly differently, the concept of capacity is based on the view that one of 
the preconditions for the enforcement of contracts is that individuals possess the 
capability for rational economic action.  One of the elements of the economic 
concept of rationality is that individuals possess stable preferences, that is, they 
can rank a given set of outcomes in order of preference.  The absence of stable 
preferences  can  be  understood  as  providing  an  economic  justification  the 
invalidation of contracts on the grounds of incapacity.   In the terms used in law 
and economics analysis, 
 
‘If  the  promisor’s  preferences  are  unstable  or  not  well-ordered, 
then he is unable to conclude a perfect contract.  The law says that 
such people’s promises are unenforceable because they are legally 
incompetent.  For example, children and the insane do not have 
stable, well-ordered preferences, and as a result, their promises are 
unenforceable…There are also special circumstances in which a 
person,  who  is  ordinarily  competent,  may  be  temporarily 
incompetent, and during that incompetency she cannot conclude 
enforceable promises.  For example, the ingestion of a prescription 
drug may make someone drowsy to the point of incompetency so 
that any promises given while in that state would be unenforceable.  
Consider a slightly more controversial example: if high pressure 
tactics are used to confuse a consumer and induce him to sign a 
contract, a court may be unwilling to enforce it.  The consumer’s 
failing is described by some lawyers as a transactional incapacity, 
that is the incapacity to conduct this transaction rationally under 
these circumstances’.
11   
 
The effect is that contract law, in one of its core doctrines, views the market as 
more  than  just  a  space  within  which  consensual  exchange  occurs.    Market 
transactions are exchanges of a particular type, founded on individuals’ capacity 
for independent judgment.     
 
We can go further.  The capacity concept is predicated upon assumptions about 
the need for institutional underpinning of market exchange.  One consequence 
of the doctrine of capacity is to provide protection to the incapable.  But the 
doctrine also protects the market against the incapable,
12 by excluding them 
from  normal  participation  in  exchange  relations.    They  may  enter  into 
transactions only with the aid of intermediaries.  The doctrines of assistance and 
representation, formally stated in the civil law and implicit to some degree in 
the  common  law  rules,  are  principally  intended  to  enhance  the  contractual 
security of third parties and thereby secure confidence in the market as a whole.  
Thus an inference which may be drawn from the structure of contract law is that   5 
legal  enforcement  of  contracts  matters,  along  with  its  corollary,  namely 
selective non-enforcement.  The maintenance of the market order depends upon 
the legal system being able to take a discriminating view about which contracts 
to enforce, and how. 
 
To say that this is a foundational assumption of the system of contract law is not 
of course the same thing as saying that it is a proposition supported by empirical 
observation or by an economic or sociological perspective on law.  It is simply 
another way of describing how the legal system views the external effects of its 
own enforcement mechanisms.  However, it is noteworthy that the idea of the 
law-economy relation which is implicit in the structure of contract law differs 
markedly  from  the  approach  which  has  become  predominant  in  the 
contemporary law and economics tradition.  Gary Becker’s highly influential 
claim that human behaviour in a wide (in fact the widest possible) range of 
contexts  can  be  explained  by  the  three  axioms  of  stable  preferences, 
maximizing behaviour, and market equilibrium, is at the heart of this tradition.
13  
From the ‘internal’ viewpoint of contract law doctrine, Becker’s basic position 
has to be qualified by the understanding that each of these conditions is not a 
natural  state  of  affairs,  but  is  instead  the  product  of  a  certain  institutional 
configuration, which is nowhere explained in Becker’s account. 
 
In considering that issue, it may be helpful to look more closely at the grounds 
on  which,  as  a  matter  of  core  contract  law,  enforcement  of  arm’s  length 
transactions is regularly and routinely denied.  In the common law systems, a 
significant set of exceptions to the principle of contractual enforcement takes 
the form of the doctrine of public policy.  This doctrine applies not to contracts 
which are vitiated by misrepresentation, mistake or coercion, but to agreements 
which are in every essential respect consensual.
14  A variety of justifications is 
offered by non-enforcement: these include headings such as ‘restraint of trade’, 
‘agreements injurious to good government’ and ‘agreements contrary to family 
life’.
15  It is an eclectic and arbitrary-looking list.  What, if anything, unites the 
different categories?  If we go beneath the formal language use by the courts, 
two  categories  suggest  themselves:  cases  in  which  the  justification  for  non-
enforcement is the protection of the market against itself (or, more precisely, 
against the deleterious effects of consensual exchange); and cases in which the 
principle is the protection of society against the market. 
   6 
Falling into the first of these categories is the doctrine of restraint of trade.  This 
has been called ‘a strange beast’; after all, 
 
‘its role in contract law is traditionally understood to be that of 
denying validity to contracts that unduly restrain the freedom of 
one or both of the contracting parties.  The doctrine appears to 
place  non-procedural  limitations  on  freedom  of  contract  and, 
moreover, to place these limitations because of a concern for the 
contracting parties’ freedom.  A concern for freedom is being used, 
it appears, to limit freedom’.
16 
  
But is it so strange?  The doctrine of restraint of trade enables the court to strike 
down  agreements,  or  parts  of  agreements,  which  unduly  limit  or  restrict 
competition.    Thus agreements  by  employees  not  to  compete  with  a  former 
employer can only be enforced if they involve the protection by the latter of a 
‘proprietary interest’ in the form of protection against solicitation of customers 
or employees, or the maintenance of confidential information or trade secrets.
17  
The doctrine has also been used in a variety of contexts to control market entry 
and exit rules, price fixing, wage regulation and other attempts of market actors 
to  control  the  competitive  process  through  agreement  among  themselves.
18  
Here,  then,  is  recognition  that  the  principle  of  freedom  of  contract  has  the 
potential  to  undermine  the  competitive  process  on  which  the  market  order 
ultimately depends for its successful operation.  Even if market relations in a 
broad sense could be maintained in a market partitioned by anti-competitive 
agreements,  the  precise  and  rather  fragile  conditions  needed  for  a  market 
equilibrium would seem to be particularly vulnerable to this kind of action.  
Thus the existence of the restraint of trade doctrine involves the recognition, 
again  from  the  core  of  contract  law  (since  this  is  an  ancient  doctrine),  that 
selective  legal  enforcement  of  contracts  is  a  necessity  if  the  market  is  to 
function effectively. 
 
Most of the other heads of public policy cannot be explained this way; rather, 
they appear to be based on the view that, important as freedom of contract is, 
there  are  certain  values  which  take  priority  over  it,  and  must  be  protected 
against it.  It is on this basis that the courts will refuse to enforce contracts 
‘contrary to public morals’, for example, or which are intended to undermine 
the government, or which oust their own jurisdiction.  Thus the family, the 
apparatus of government, and the legal system itself are institutions which are 
not  just  separate  from  the  market,  and  which  operate  on  a  distinctive  and 
separate logic, but which also need protection from its potentially destabilizing 
effects.   
   7 
However, as it stands, the list of grounds of non-enforcement is selective, and 
arguably outdated.  This is the result of the courts’ insistence, at the end of the 
nineteenth century, that the heads of public policy, as they then existed, were a 
closed set.
19  This position was no doubt influenced by the view, widely held at 
the  time,  that  the  foremost  goal  of  public  policy  should  be  to  defend  the 
principle of freedom of contract itself.
20  But it also reflected a perception that 
regulatory legislation was a more effective and legitimate mechanism than the 
judge-made common law for regulating contractual relations.  In this respect the 
English courts of 1890s, for example, were simply anticipating the expansion of 
regulatory  legislation  which  began  to  gather  speed  around  the  turn  of  the 
twentieth century. 
 
In both these manifestations – protecting the market against itself and protecting 
other social institutions against the market – the public policy doctrine operates 
in manner closely related to the concept of capacity.  Across a wide range of 
consensual  contracts,  the  law  refuses  to  lend  its  support  to  contract 
enforcement.  The existence of doctrines at the core of the judge-made law, in 
the common law systems, and embedded in the civil law codes, which formally 
limit freedom of contract in the interest of maintaining the market order and the 
wider social fabric of which it forms a part, is a sign that the market is not a 
self-constituting  order,  and  that  the  conditions  for  its  successful  operation  – 
including  the  foundational  notions  of  individual  rationality  and  market 
equilibrium – are not natural, but institutional, in origin.  
 
3.  The  transformation  of  the  concept  of  capacity  in  the  modern  law  of 
contracts 
 
The diminishing importance of the capacity concept in contract law is part of a 
dual movement which took place in the course of the twentieth century.  The 
first was the abolition of rules denying capacity to entire groups, in particular 
married women, a process which was still continuing in some jurisdictions in 
the middle decades of the century.
21  The reduction of the age of majority from 
21 to 18 also removed most of the more significant cases of minors’ contracts 
from the scope of the rule.
22  The second was the emergence of alternative 
techniques  for  countering  the  risk  of  exploitation  in  highly  unbalanced  or 
unequal contracts.  Where the concept of capacity provided protection to the 
weak or vulnerable by denying legal enforcement to their contracts, thereby 
excluding  them  from  independent  participation  in  economic  life,  statutory 
regulation inserted mandatory and ‘default’ terms into contracts for the benefit 
of parties deemed to be at a disadvantage in terms of bargaining power.   
   8 
Courts initially reacted with extreme hostility to what they saw as a new form of 
paternalism which undermined the contractual autonomy of the protected party 
and marked a reversion from contract to status.  The English Court of Appeal, 
in giving a restrictive interpretation to workmen’s compensation legislation in a 
judgment in 1905, noted that  
 
‘it  presupposes  a  position  of  dependence;  it  treats  the  class  of 
workmen as being in a sense “inopes consilii”, and the Legislature 
does for them what they cannot do for themselves: it gives them a 
sort of State insurance, it being assumed that they are either not 
sufficiently  intelligent  or  not  sufficiently  in  funds  to  insure 
themselves’.
23   
 
In the same year, the language of capacity was used by the US Supreme Court 
in deciding, in the pivotal Lochner case, that statutory restrictions on working 
time were unconstitutional: 
 
‘when the state, by its legislature, in the assumed exercise of its 
police powers, has passed an act which seriously limits the right to 
labor or the right of contract in regard to their means of livelihood 
between persons who are sui juris (both employer and employee), 
it becomes of great importance to determine which shall prevail, - 
the right of the individual to labor for such time as he may choose, 
or the right of the state to prevent the individual from laboring, or 
from  entering  into  any  contract  to  labor,  beyond  a  certain  time 
prescribed by the state’.
24 
 
The majority concluded: 
 
‘There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of 
person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of 
labor, in the occupation of a baker. There is no contention that 
bakers as a class are not equal in intelligence and capacity to men 
in other trades or manual occupations, or that they are not able to 
assert their rights and care for themselves without the protecting 
arm of the state, interfering with their independence of judgment 
and of action. They are in no sense wards of the state’.
25 
 
The  ‘substantive  due  process’  doctrine  which  Lochner  established  was 
nevertheless  held,  from  an  early  stage,  to  have  no  application  to  statutes 
concerning child and female labour.
26  These categories of employment were 
still  overshadowed  by  the  common  law  doctrine  of  contractual  incapacity:   9 
‘history discloses the fact that woman has always been dependent upon man… 
As minors, though not to the same extent, she has been looked upon in the 
courts as needing especial care that her rights may be preserved’.
27  In time, 
courts  and  legislatures  arrived  at  a  different  justification:  all  workers  were 
entitled to a basic level of health and safety protection, in order to protect their 
physical integrity.  The germ of this idea was present in Lochner itself, in the 
dissenting  judgment.    Noting,  in  passing,  that  ‘there  are  very  few,  if  any, 
questions in political economy about which entire certainty may be predicated’, 
the minority argued that  
 
‘It is enough for the determination of this case, and it is enough for 
this court to know, that the question is one about which there is 
room for debate and for an honest difference of opinion. There are 
many reasons of a weighty, substantial character, based upon the 
experience  of  mankind,  in  support  of  the  theory  that,  all  things 
considered, more than ten hours’ steady work each day, from week 
to week, in a bakery or confectionery establishment, may endanger 
the  health  and  shorten  the  lives  of  the  workmen,  thereby 
diminishing their physical and mental capacity to serve the state 
and to provide for those dependent upon them’.
28 
 
Thus the claim that social legislation possesses a capacity-enhancing effect was 
present at very beginning of the debate.  In Lochner, the issue was phrased in 
terms of the physical integrity of the individual worker; the evolution of labour 
legislation from its early twentieth century beginnings can be understood as a 
gradual expansion of the range of interests which the law recognises to be at 
stake in the formation and performance of the contract of employment.  These 
have  been  extended,  in  varying  degrees  in  different  systems,  to  include  the 
economic  security,  psychological  well  being  and  personal  dignity  of  the 
individual.
29    Thus  laws  which  provide  protection  against  the  risks  of 
interruption  to  earnings  through  illness,  unemployment  and  old  age  (social 
insurance law), guarantee freedom of association for the purposes of collective 
action (collective labour law), stabilize the employment relationship against the 
consequences of economic uncertainty and the arbitrary exercise of employer 
power (unfair dismissal law), and insert basic labour standards with respect to 
the wage-work bargain and maximum hours of work, can all be understood as 
underpinning the contractual capacity of the worker.  The presence of these 
norms makes it possible for the individual worker to enter into a contract which 
is  necessarily  incomplete  and  asymmetrical.    Such  regulatory  norms  do  not 
‘complete’ the contract or render it fully symmetrical, but they do compensate 
for the effects of incompleteness and asymmetry.  Far from undermining the 
unilateral  or  prerogative  power  of  the  employer  (‘subordination’),  they   10 
acknowledge its existence and legitimacy.  To view labour law in this way is to 
recognize  that  it  has  information-sharing  and  risk-allocation  functions  in 
additional to the more explicitly ‘protective’ ones which are generally attributed 
to it.
30  This is not just ‘paternalism’, nor is it simply ‘redistribution’, despite the 
widespread use of such terms on both sides of the long debate concerning the 
legitimacy of the legislative regulation of contracts.
31  The process of inserting 
‘social rights’ into the employment contract is one by which labour law re-
establishes a contractual equilibrium between the parties.   
 
A similar argument can be made for consumer protection legislation.   Laws use 
a variety of techniques to protect individual purchasers of services or products 
in their dealings with business entities.  Exclusion and limitation clauses may be 
struck out, and contract terms which are not individually negotiated may be 
subjected to a proportionality test.  In consumer credit contracts, legislation may 
provide for ‘cooling-off periods’ or go so far as to require the provision of an 
independent  third  party  opinion.    The  justification  for  this  type  of  statutory 
control has gradually shifted over time from a focus on contractual inequality 
and the absence of ‘real’ consensus in standard-form agreements,
32 to the view 
that the role of the law is to provide incentives for information sharing and risk-
shifting between the parties.
33  The effect has accordingly been described as 
enhancing the financial capacity of the individual.
34   
 
4. Assessing the deregulatory critique of social legislation 
 
Notwithstanding the arguments which have just been made, a return to Lochner-
type  critiques  of  legislative  controls  over  contract  terms  is  a  distinct  recent 
trend, affecting all jurisdictions.  How should they be assessed?   
 
The common thread running through these critiques is the view that the market 
is a self-equilibrating order, in the context of which legislative norms constitute 
an ‘interference’ or ‘distortion’, preventing the operation of spontaneous forces.  
Deregulation, by stripping away layers of legislative control, can be expected to 
restore market mechanisms to their full operation.  This view of the market 
owes much to the main methodological move within economic accounts of law, 
which is to imagine a world of frictionless exchange – a ‘zero transaction cost 
world’ – and then to loosen the assumptions underlying the model, in ways 
which  invite  a  consideration  of  the  sources  of  market  imperfections.    The 
foundational assumptions of neoclassical economics offer no obvious place for 
a normative order of any kind, other than the self-regulating order of the market 
which is itself ultimately reducible to the tendency of individuals to engage in 
maximizing behaviour.  As we have seen, in Becker’s account, individuals are 
assumed to act rationally, in the sense of maximizing their own well being in   11 
the face of constraints, on the basis of pre-given, ‘stable’ or ranked preferences; 
likewise,  markets  are  assumed  to  clear,  if  they  are  not  interfered  with  by 
external  forces.    The  mathematical  proofs  of  the  ‘fundamental’  theorems  of 
welfare economics are generally understood as demonstrating that in a world of 
purely  competitive  markets,  the  aggregate  well  being  of  all  market  actors  – 
buyers and sellers – is necessarily maximized.   
 
However, in the ‘new institutional’ variant of the law and economics literature, 
these various assumptions are relaxed, precisely so that a functional relationship 
between  the  market  system  and  the  legal-normative  order  can  be  identified.  
The environment may be less than perfect: contracts may be complex and hence 
incomplete, or exchange vitiated by externalities or asymmetrical information, 
leading to persistent market imperfections, to which contract law responds.
35  
The basic behavioural assumptions of the model can be modified, through the 
concept  of  ‘bounded’  rationality,
36  or  through  the  use  of  experimental  or 
psychological evidence for the existence of cognitive biases or traits which, if 
present  in  particular  contexts,  prevent  the  realization  of  equilibrium  states.
37  
These  techniques  can  be,  and  have  been,  used  to  justify  departures  from  a 
regime  of  complete  freedom  of  contract.    Such  interventions,  whether  they 
originate in the realm of ‘classical’ private law or in regulatory legislation, can 
be understood as aligning the allocation of economic resources more closely to 
that of a perfectly competitive market – a ‘market perfecting’ agenda.  To that 
extent, the techniques used in the economics of law do not inevitably point in 
the direction of deregulation.   
 
On the other hand, the presence of market imperfections does not necessarily 
justify regulation; many such imperfections are thought to be ‘irremediable’ 
because the costs of intervention can be expected to outweigh the benefits.
38  
Public  choice  theory  dictates  that  this  is  particularly  likely  in  the  case  of 
legislative intervention, since the political process is thought to be especially 
vulnerable to the distorting effects of organized pressure group activity.  The 
predominant theory of rule-making in the common law argues that judge-made 
law, by contrast, contains a self-correcting mechanism, in the form of private 
incentives for litigation, for the deselection of inefficient (or wealth-destroying) 
rules.
39  Some analyses have built on this argument to claim that legal systems 
which rely predominantly on legislation as a mode of rule-making are for that 
reason less adaptable, and hence less efficient, than those which give a greater 
priority to judge-made law; and this claim, in turn, has been used to argue that 
civil law systems are inherently less supportive of economic growth than those 
of the common law.
40  This ‘legal origin’ claim has nevertheless been contested 
on  both  methodological  and  empirical  grounds.    It  is  far  from  clear,  for 
example, that the characterization of common law and civil law systems in the   12 
most-cited studies in this area is accurate,
41 or that the mechanism by which 
legal origin (common law or civil law) translates into substantive rules of law 
has been adequately specified.
42  Nevertheless, it is having a tangible effect on 
the policy initiatives of the World Bank and IMF.
43  
 
One aspect of the recent legal origin literature is a revival of interest in F.A. 
Hayek’s  account  of  private  law.
44    This  differs  from  the  modern  law  and 
economic synthesis in accepting, at a foundational level, the need for a legal-
normative order to underpin market relations.  Institutions are no longer viewed 
as isolated interventions, designed to counteract the effects of market failure.  
Rather, the ‘abstract rules of just conduct’ – in essence, the rules of contract, 
property and tort – are seen as functionally necessary for establishing freedom 
of disposition and security of transactions in the market place.  By contrast, 
Hayek insists that social legislation, since it largely has a redistributive goal, 
interferes with market relations, in a way which undermines the spontaneous 
ordering of the market and of society more generally.  More generally, Hayek 
argues that here, as elsewhere, ‘attempts to “correct’ the order of the market 
lead to its destruction’,
45 suggesting that his schema is even less amenable to 
legal intervention than the market-perfecting agenda which characterizes most 
contemporary law and economics analysis.   
 
The main empirical argument buttressing Hayek’s account is historical: private 
law  represents  the  core  of  a  system  of  contract  and  property  rights  which 
predated the advent of twentieth century social legislation.  In the nineteenth 
century, Richard Epstein suggests, US labour relations  ‘was governed by a set 
of laws that spanned the law of property, contract, tort and procedure’; in other 
words, a ‘common law’ of labour relations which could be reestablished if the 
New Deal labour laws of the 1930s onwards were repealed.
46  In the civil law, 
the  concept  of  the  ‘private  law  society’  (in  the  German  tradition,  the 
Privatsrechtsgemeinschaft) expresses the same idea of a self-equilibrating legal 
order,  which  found  its  highest  expression  in  the  nineteenth  century  codes.
47  
This  view  of  history  is,  at  best,  highly  selective,  and  at  worst,  actively 
misleading.  In nineteenth century labour and product markets, the police power 
of the state buttressed the relations of private law: criminal sanctions were used 
to  enforce  labour  contracts  and  break  strikes.
48    It  was  this  state-based 
disciplinary  power,  rather  than  a  pure  private  law  regime,  which  the  social 
legislation of the twentieth century displaced.
49 
 
If the weakest point of the neoliberal critique of market regulation is the claim 
that a return to a private law society is possible (let alone desirable),
50 rejection 
of this claim is not, however, synonymous with uncritical acceptance of the 
model of social legislation inherited from the middle decades of the twentieth   13 
century.  Legislation regulating the contract of employment gave expression to 
a societal compact, in which inequality within the enterprise (the employee’s 
‘subordination’ to managerial prerogative) was traded off in return for certain 
social guarantees (such as protection against risks arising from injury, illness, 
unemployment, old age).  That  model was based on assumptions which are 
perhaps  as  questionable,  although  for  different  reasons,  as  the  assumptions 
made  in  the  Hayekian  or  neoliberal  critique  of  regulatory  legislation.    In 
particular,  the  employment  model  of  the  mid-twentieth  century  assumed  the 
vertical integration of the enterprise and the traditional division of labour within 
the  nuclear  family.    The  power  of  the  nation  state  to  regulate  social  and 
economic relations through legislation was also more or less taken for granted. 
In all these respects, the employment  model was very much a product of a 
particular mid-twentieth century consensus which is now called into question.
51  
The  disintegration  of  the  enterprise  through  mergers  and  acquisitions, 
outsourcing and subcontracting; changing family structures; and a perception of 
the  limits  to  state-based  legislative  ordering  of  economic  relations,  together 
mean that the employment model is less and less able to fulfill its ‘cornerstone’ 
role  of  ensuring  social  protection  while  also  providing  a  framework  for  the 
governance of work.  The current ‘crisis’ of the regulatory state therefore arises 
less from its supposed incompatibility with a market economy, than from the 
contingency of the particular circumstances under which certain institutional 
forms,  in  particular  the  employment  model,  emerged  in  the  course  of  the 
twentieth  century.
52    Is  it  possible  to  renew  the  employment  model  and 
associated institutions of contractual regulation, in a way which aligns them 
with the today’s changed conditions? 
 
5. Contract law, market access and the capability approach 
 
The starting point for consideration of this question is to reexamine the concept 
of capacity which has been inherited from the private law codes and judge-
made common law of the nineteenth century.  As we have seen, capacity is the 
device by which the law accords individuals the power to enter into contracts 
(among other things).  It involves the attribution of a set of legal powers to 
market actors.  The abolition of traditional grounds of incapacity such as sex 
and marital status has left only age, to a limited extent, and mental incapability 
as  grounds  for  denying  parties  the  power  to  make  legally  enforceable 
agreements.  Thus capacity has come to be defined in a sense which is both 
negative  and  narrow,  as  the  absence  of  the  ability  to  make  reasoned, 
independent  judgments.    While  this  is  a  vital  precondition  for  the  effective 
functioning of a market order, it can be argued that is only one of a number of 
conditions  which  are  necessary  in  order  for  the  market  to  operate  as  an 
instrument for the creation of well being in society.  That there is a wider set of   14 
such requirements – involving institutions for sharing information, allocating 
risks and compensating for the effects of externalities – is implicitly recognized 
in the structure of laws inserting mandatory and default terms into contracts.  
These legal interventions can be seen as enhancing the contractual capacity of 
market agents, in the sense of endowing them with the resources needed to 
participate  in  market  exchange  in  more  than  a  purely  formal  or  procedural 
sense.  To view contractual regulation in this way is to counter the neoliberal 
critique which views protective legislation as simply carving out exceptions to 
the general principle of freedom of contract, with the result that contract law is 
parcellised and its effects fragmented.  To enlarge on this counter-critique, it is 
necessary to locate a more complete conceptual analysis of capacity within a 
wider  legal  and  economic  discussion  of  the  institutional  preconditions  of 
markets. 
 
In  the  ‘standard’  (in  the  sense  of  orthodox  or  generally  accepted)  law  and 
economics approach, the operation of markets results in the maximization of the 
aggregate  wealth  or  well  being  of  market  actors,  because  it  ensures  to  the 
greatest possible extent that the sum total of the preferences or wants of those 
actors is met.  Individual choices cannot fully reflect individual preferences; 
choices  are  constrained  both  by  the  resources  and  entitlements  with  which 
particular individuals happen to be endowed and, in effect, by the preferences of 
all other actors.  However, aggregate utility can be maximized if full scope is 
given for free exchange to occur, so that resources will end up in the hands of 
those who value them most highly.  Market-based exchange is the most reliable 
mechanism for enhancing economic welfare under conditions of scarcity.  It is 
through the act of contracting, unless it is vitiated by factors such as force or 
fraud, that individuals can express their preferences most consistently with the 
principle  of  constrained  maximisation.    This  is  the  basis  for  the  current 
orientation  of  normative  law  and  economics  analysis  towards  freedom  of 
contract and it is also consistent with the negative and narrow version of the 
capacity  concept  which  has  been  inherited  from  the  contract  law  of  the 
nineteenth century. 
 
In this approach, resources, endowments and preferences are all taken as given; 
that is to say, they are exogenous to the operation of the market mechanism.  
The assumption of exogeneity is a necessary correlate of the assumption of 
constrained  maximization.    The  standard  economic  model  does  not  concern 
itself  with  the  process  by  which  preferences  and  endowments  are  formed.
53  
This is the economic-theoretical equivalent of the idea that contract law is not 
concerned with the objective value of the consideration given for a promise.
54  
Both ideas can be traced back to the period during which notions such as the 
‘just price’ were banished to the margins of contract law.
55     15 
The  more  recent  introduction  into  economic  theory  of  the  concept  of 
‘capability’ introduces a new dimension to this question.  Rather than using the 
language of the maximization of preferences, the capability approach refers to 
the ‘conversion’ of an individual’s endowments into various desired end-states 
or activities, known as ‘functionings’.  An individual’s capability set refers to 
the extent of their substantive freedom to realize a range of functionings:   
 
the concept of  ‘functionings’… reflects the various things a person 
may value doing or being.  The valued functionings may vary from 
elementary  ones,  such  as  being  adequately  nourished  and  being 
free from avoidable disease, to very complex activities or personal 
states, such as being able to take part in the life of the community 
and having self-respect… A ‘capability’ [is] a kind of freedom: the 




So far this appears to be no different to the standard economic approach.  The 
difference, for present purposes, comes at the point where the nature of the 
‘conversion’ of resources or commodities into outcomes is being considered.  
Amartya Sen puts it in the following way, using the example of eating as a 
nutritional and social activity: 
 
The  conversion  of  commodity-characteristics  into  personal 
achievements  of  functioning  depends  on  a  variety  of  factors  – 
personal  and  social.  In  the  case  of  nutritional  achievement  it 
depends on such factors as (1) metabolic rates, (2) body size, (3) 
age, (4) sex (and, if a woman, whether pregnant or lactating), (5) 
activity levels, (6) medical conditions (including the presence or 
absence of parasites), (7) access to medical services and the ability 
to  use  them,  (8)  nutritional  knowledge  and  education,  and  (9) 
climatic conditions.  In the case of achievements involving social 
behaviour and entertaining friends and relatives, the functioning 
will  depend  on  such  influences  as  (1)  the  nature  of  the  social 
conventions in force in the society in which the person lives, (2) 
the position of the person in the family and in the society, (3) the 
presence  or  absence  of  festivities  such  as  marriage,  seasonal 
festivals  and  other  occasions  such  as  funerals,  (4)  the  physical 
distance from the homes of friends and relatives and so on.
57 
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The conversion of endowments and preferences  into substantive freedoms – 
capabilities  –  precedes  choice  (see  Figure  1).      Thus  it  is  not  simply  a 
consequence of individuals engaging in ‘constrained maximisation’.  Instead, 
the  capability  approach  identifies  a  range  of  ‘conversion  factors’  which  are 
necessary for capabilities to come into existence.  Conversion factors operate at 
multiple levels.  Thus a person’s capability to achieve a particular range of 
functionings could be determined not just by the characteristics (both physical 
and  social)  of  their  person  or  even  simply  by  the  wider  physical  and 
technological environment, but also by the organizational context of their lives 
(inter-personal networks of the kind which may be based on family, kinship, 
personal  connection,  the  workplace  or  membership  of  an  occupational  or 
professional  group).    Critically,  social  institutions  such  as  the  social  norms, 
legal rules and legal-political forms which play a constitutive role in relation to 





















Thus in the capability approach, institutional rules do not simply constrain, they 
also  empower.    There  are  further  points  of  difference  with  the  standard 
approach.  The quality of choice is not simply a function of the resources with 
which the individual is endowed or of their power for rational action; it also 
dependent  on  the  institutional  framework  in  which  the  relevant  exchange  is 
lodged.  No doubt an effectively operating contract enforcement system has the 
potential to enhance individual capabilities in the context of exchange.  But it is 
no more than one of the mechanisms which can achieve this end.   It is neither 
necessary nor sufficient.   
Resources 
 








Choice    17 
What would a contract law system look like if it encapsulated the capability 
approach  rather  than  the  standard  approach  to  the  conceptualisation  of 
economic exchange?  The answer to that question is that it would look very 
much like the kinds of contract law regime that are observed in European (and 
other) systems today – that is to say, regimes in which the classical principles of 
freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda are complemented by mandatory 
and default norms of various kinds, mostly originating in legislation.  Thus the 
main reason for taking the capability approach seriously in the present context 
is  that  it  offers  a  more  complete  and  coherent  account  of  the  structure  and 
functioning of the modern law of contracts than that offered by the standard law 
and economics approach.  This would be an account in which the capacity-
enhancing role of contractual regulation is recognized as an ordering principle 
for the law of contracts. 
 
The point has already been made that even in the classical, nineteenth century 
core of contract law, it is possible find exceptions to the principle of contract 
enforcement which imply limits to the idea of the self-ordering market, and, 
indeed,  to  the  idea  of  a  market  order  which  is  independent  of  other  social 
institutions.  Even the restricted doctrine of public policy in the common law 
attests  to  the  functional  importance  of  conjoining  the  market  order  with 
complementary social institutions such as the family and the legal system itself.  
There is a far greater volume and variety of laws qualifying freedom of contract 
and  regulating  contractual  relations  in  contemporary  societies.    An  example 
taken from one particular type of legislation affecting the employment contract 
may illustrate the potential relevance of the capability approach in helping us to 
understand the relationship of such regulation to the market order. 
 
Discrimination law is the product of a series of legislative interventions which 
appear very substantially to constrain freedom of contract in the employment 
sphere.
59    Because  the  anti-discrimination  principle  affects  all  stages  of  the 
employment  relationship,  including  hiring  as  well  as  the  performance  and 
termination of the contract, its regulatory scope is potentially more far-reaching 
than  laws  stipulating  basic  standards  for  wages  and  hours  or  regulating  the 
process of dismissal.  The grounds on which discrimination is prohibited have 
steadily been extended over time, to cover not just race and sex as in legislation 
of the 1960s and 1970s, but, as a consequence of recent legislative activity, 
sexual  orientation,  religion  or  belief,  age  and  disability.
60    The  anti-
discrimination principle is, in many jurisdictions, embodied in constitutional 
texts,  and  thereby  acquires  the  additional  normative  force  of  a  fundamental 
social right.
61  It has both a collective and an individual dimension: on the one 
hand, it attacks institutional manifestations of group disadvantage, while on the 
other hand it profoundly individualises the position of the labour market actor,   18 
by insisting that their membership of a particular sexual or racial group (and so 
on) may not be used as a criterion for determining their access to employment 
or work-related benefits.  In all these respects, discrimination law provides the 
template for what labour law might become, or is in the process of becoming.  
As it extends to applicants for employment and certain categories of the self-
employed, as well as to employees,
62 discrimination law has already largely 
overcome the rigid division between employees and independent workers which 
has severely limited the effectiveness of traditional protective legislation.
63   
 
The near universality of the anti-discrimination principle – it is a powerful and 
pervasive force even in legal systems, such as the United States, which are often 
(incorrectly) described as having little or no statutory regulation of employment 
– and its recent extension at a time when most other forms of employment 
legislation have been in retreat, suggests that it is not simply compatible with a 
‘fluid’  or  ‘flexible’  labour  market  order  of  the  kind  which  is  increasingly 
recognized to have come into existence with the decline of traditional forms of 
workplace  organization  and  collective  solidarity;  it  is  fundamental  to  the 
contemporary  model  of  labour  market  flexibility.    Discrimination  law  has 
extended the scope  of the labour market and actively promoted competition 
over and in relation to employment.  Yet it does so by promoting an openly 
distributive  agenda,  in  supporting  the  rights  of  historically  excluded  or 
marginalized groups (such as married women) to participate in employment on 
an equal basis (in principle) with those previously privileged (such as ‘male 
breadwinners’). 
 
Discrimination law stands in the same relation to classical contract law as the 
capability approach stands in relation to standard law and economics analysis.   
Becker, again, has expressed the received approach most clearly: discrimination 
law is unnecessary because the cure for discrimination lies in the market itself.  
Employers with a ‘taste’ or preference for hiring men instead of women would 
pay a price for doing so – unless it was the simply the case all along that in 
hiring men, they were acting rationally.  Where unequal pay and job segregation 
persist, they most likely represent efficient resource allocations.
64  It is perhaps 
an open question as to why Becker’s view, first expressed in the 1950s a few 
years before the advent of US civil rights legislation
65 and decades before the 
adoption of European directives on equal treatment in employment,
66 did not 
have a greater influence on legislators.  Was it because of ‘rent seeking’ by 
insider groups?  Or because classical contract law was widely perceived to be 
an inadequate mechanism for promoting economic integration of the kind which 
has accompanied the legal recognition of the equal treatment principle? 
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The capacity-enhancing function of discrimination law is particularly evident in 
the  case  of  what  is  arguably  the  most  advanced  type  of  equal  treatment 
legislation, that is, legislation prohibiting disability discrimination.  This type of 
legislation  is  ‘advanced’  in  the  sense  that  concepts  used  elsewhere  in 
discrimination law – ‘direct discrimination’, referring to unequal treatment on 
prohibited  grounds,  and  ‘indirect  discrimination’,  referring  to  group 
disadvantage arising from institutional practices – have been modified in the 
context of disability, to produce a ‘duty of reasonable adjustment’ on the part of 
the employer.
67  This means that the employer has a responsibility to organise 
the workplace in such a way as to enable the individual worker to carry out the 
duties of the post in question, taking their disability into account.  The duty is 
not  absolute;  the  court  applies  in  essence  a  proportionality  test,  taking  into 
account the cost and practicability of adjustments and their impact on the ability 
of  the  worker  to  carry  out  the  task.    But  even  so, the  effect  is  to  alter  the 
conceptual framework of discrimination law in ways which point to its potential 
for  enhancing  capabilities.    The  effect  of  the  legislation  was  described  in  a 
recent House of Lords case, Archibald v. Fife Council,
68 as follows: 
 
‘[the  Disability  Discrimination  Act]  is  different  from  the  Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 and the Race Relations Act 1976.  In the 
latter two, men and women or black and white, as the case may be, 
are opposite sides of the same coin.  Each is to be treated in the 
same  way.    Treating  men  more  favourably  than  women 
discriminates against women.  Treating women more favourably 
than  men  discriminates  against  men.    Pregnancy  apart,  the 
differences  between  the  two  genders  are  generally  regarded  as 
irrelevant.  The 1995 Act, however, does not regard the differences 
between  disabled  people  and  others  as  irrelevant.    It  does  not 
expect each to be treated in the same way.  It expects reasonable 
adjustments to be made to cater for the special needs of disabled 
people.    It  necessarily  entails  an  element  of  more  favourable 
treatment’. 
 
The following case, taken from guidance in the form of a code of practice, 
illustrates the effect in practice of the legislation: 
 
‘An applicant for an administrative job appears not to be the best 
person for the job, but only because her typing speed is too slow as 
a  result  of  arthritis  in  her  hands.    If  a  reasonable  adjustment  – 
perhaps an adapted keyboard – would overcome this, her typing 
speed would not in itself be a substantial reason for not employing 
her.  Therefore the employer would be unlawfully discriminating 




The effect is striking – rather than requiring the individual to be ‘adaptable’ to 
changing  market  conditions,  the  law  requires  that  employment  practices  be 
adapted to the circumstances of the individual.  If disability discrimination laws 
go  further  than  most  forms  of  social  legislation  currently  do  in  imposing 
affirmative duties on employer in the name of market access, they nevertheless 
exemplify the tendency of the law to grant substantive recognition to new forms 
of contractual capacity, or, in economic terms, ‘capability’.  The extension of 
the labour market in contemporary societies is coterminous with the advance of 




This paper has argued that capacitas or capacity should be thought of as the 
juridical  concept  through  which  the  legal  system  defines  the  conditions  of 
access to the market.  The various ways in which capacity has been defined, in 
different periods and in different legal systems, is therefore revealing of ways in 
which  the  relationship  between  the  legal  system  and  the  market  can  be 
conceptualised.  In a narrow conception, capacity is defined as the ability to 
engage in rational economic action (in economic-theoretical terms, constrained 
maximisation  on  the  basis  of  stable  preferences).    The  consequence  of  the 
absence of capacity in this sense is the denial to the individual of the normal 
legal support for the enforcement of contracts.  In a wider conception, capacity 
or capacitas is the sum total of the preconditions of effective participation in 
market relations, and the role of the law shifts from the selective enforcement of 
contracts, to the insertion into contracts of mandatory and default terms which 
serve  a  variety  of  functions.    These  include  reallocations  of  risk  and 
information,  which  are  meant  to  offset  the  consequences  of  unbalanced  or 
asymmetrical  contracts.    However,  contractual  regulation  also  has  a  wider 
remit,  which  is  to  protect  and  enhance  the  capability  of  the  individual, 
understood as the substantive freedom to realise, through participation in the 
market, a range of desired end-states and activities.   
 
It can be seen from this analysis that the debate over the scope and meaning of 
the  capacity  concept  is  essentially  an  argument  over  the  nature  of  the 
institutional preconditions of a market order.  The idea of the self-equilibrating 
or self-regulating market lies at the core of the predominant approach within the 
contemporary law and economics movement and of the related deregulatory 
critique of social legislation.  It is also inscribed in a particular judicial attitude 
to contractual regulation which a century ago found expression in the Lochner 
judgment in the United States and in the restrictive interpretation given by the   21 
English courts to the early legislation of the welfare state.  According to this 
view, contractual relations rest upon a system of private law whose qualities of 
autonomy  and  self-regulation  mirror  those  of  the  market  itself.    Social 
legislation appears, in this context, as an illegitimate interference. 
 
The  contrasting  view  is  one  in  which  contractual  regulation  complements, 
rather than obstructs, the institutions of private law in providing a framework 
for exchange relations.  In this paper, examples have been given to illustrate this 
point from consumer law, employment law and discrimination law.  A law of 
contracts constructed around the notion that the law has a role in protecting and 
enhancing capabilities is, it may be argued, in the process of emerging at these 
points of interaction between private law and social legislation.  This would be 
a law of contracts in which the market was seen, not as an end in itself, but an 
institution for enhancing the substantive economic freedom of individuals; a 
law  of  contracts,  in  other  words,  in  which  the  market  was  adapted  to  the 
condition  of  the  individual,  rather  than  the  individual  being  adapted  to  the 
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